A detailed historical map of Amsterdam, showing the city's unique canal system and grid of streets. The map is rendered in a classic, hand-drawn style with various colors for different areas and buildings. The text of the conference is overlaid on a white, rounded rectangular area in the center of the map.

AMSTERDAM GRADUATE CONFERENCE IN POLITICAL THEORY



uring the second annual Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Political Theory twelve participants, seven discussants, and two keynote speakers will gather virtually to discuss developments at the intersection of political theory and philosophy and economics. Apart from the keynotes, these presentations will be organized along six themes: public reason, migration, republicanism, ideology, power, and exploitation.

28–29 MAY 2020

Adrian Kreutz • Annelien de Dijn • Aristel Skrbic
Davide Pala • Dorothea Gädeke • Enzo Rossi
Gordon Arlen • Hannah McHugh • Henrik Kugelberg
Joshua Folkerts • Julia Jakobi • Karuna Mantena
Laura Santi Amantini • Laura Valentini
Maxmillian Afnan • Nanda Oudejans
Nicholas Vrousalis • Nikhil Venkatesh
Stanislas Richard • Tamar de Waal
William Chan

ORGANISERS

Akshath Jitendranath • Sanne Groothuis
Stefano Merlo • Marina Uzunova

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IN POLITICAL THEORY

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Karuna Mantena

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Maxmillian Afnan

Henrik Kugelberg

SESSION 2 · (IM)MIGRATION

Aristel Skrbic

Laura Santi Amantini

SESSION 3 · REPUBLICANISM

Davide Pala

Hannah McHugh

SESSION 4 · IDEOLOGY AND TIME

Adrian Kreutz

Joshua Folkerts

SESSION 5 · POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

William Chan

Julia Jakobi

SESSION 6 · SURVEILLANCE AND EXPLOITATION

Nikhil Venkatesh

Stanislas Richard

SCHEDULE



28 MAY 2020

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of rights differentiation for temporary workers
 2. Laura Santi Amantini · Why are forced migrants special?
The distinctive harms of displacement
- 15:15–15:30 COFFEE BREAK
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 2. Hannah McHugh · Rescuing the dominator
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All times are in Central European Summer Time (CEST) which is equivalent to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) + 2 hours. Use this handy time zone converter to check your local time.

SCHEDULE



29 MAY 2020

- 09:30–11:00 SESSION 4 · IDEOLOGY AND TIME
1. Adrian Kreutz · Whence and whither genealogical ideology-critique?
 2. Joshua Folkerts · Interpretations of social questions through time: Epistemological and normative implications for state welfare
- 11:00–11:15 COFFEE BREAK
- 11:15–12:45 SESSION 5 · POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY
1. William Chan · Meriting political power
 2. Julia Jakobi · Control and accountability in lottocracy
- 12:45–13:45 LUNCH BREAK
- 13:45–15:15 SESSION 6 · SURVEILLANCE AND EXPLOITATION
1. Nikhil Venkatesh · Surveillance capitalism: A Marx-inspired account
 2. Stanislas Richard · Exploitation as price disequilibrium
- 15:15–15:30 COFFEE BREAK
- 15:30–17:00 KEYNOTE LECTURE
- Karuna Mantena · Gandhi and the hazards of action
- 17:00 DRINKS

All times are in Central European Summer Time (CEST) which is equivalent to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) + 2 hours. Use this handy time zone converter to check your local time.

THE AMSTERDAM GRADUATE CONFERENCE IN POLITICAL THEORY



I. WELCOME
FROM THE ORGANISERS

2. ABOUT THE
AMSTERDAM GRADUATE
CONFERENCE IN POLITICAL THEORY

3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

4. THE ORGANISERS

WELCOME FROM THE ORGANISERS

To begin, we hope that you and your loved ones are in good health and spirits, and that you all are dealing with the present situation we all find ourselves in as best as possible.

While we would have loved to meet you physically in Amsterdam at the start of—what already looks like—a beautiful summer, the present global crisis would unfortunately not allow this. Nonetheless, and albeit in a virtual environment that is necessitated by the aforementioned crisis, we—Akshath, Marina, Sanne, and Stefano—take great pleasure in welcoming you to the second annual Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Political Theory. Over the two days of the conference we hope that we can, in our own limited way, address two issues that the crisis has highlighted for us. First, while thinking seriously about politics has always been important, a crisis is as good a time as any to be reminded of the centrality of politics to our lives. Especially the centrality of thinking carefully, and deeply, about political theory. We hope to do this together over the two days of the conference. Second, even with norms of physical distancing in place, it does not follow that we need to maintain great social distances between us. Indeed, over the two days of the conference we hope that we will get to know each other over discussions about our papers, our more general academic and non-academic interests, and yes, make new friends with fellow graduate students over food and drinks as well.

Finally, we would also like to emphasise our gratitude to each and every one of you for agreeing—at a very short notice—to still be a part of the conference after we made the call to move to a virtual environment. Thank you very much, and here's hoping that we all have an exciting conference!



AKSHATH · MARINA · SANNE · STEFANO

ABOUT THE AMSTERDAM GRADUATE CONFERENCE IN POLITICAL THEORY

The Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Political Theory is a joint enterprise of Ph.D. students from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (John Stuart Mill College), and the Universiteit van Amsterdam (Departments of Philosophy and Political Science).

The conference offers graduate students and postdocs the opportunity to present their research in a vibrant intellectual environment and receive feedback from dedicated discussants. Giving participants the opportunity to engage with faculty and students from the Universiteit van Amsterdam, the Vrije Universiteit as well as the keynote speakers. Another explicit aim of the conference is to build a community and a network among those Ph.D. candidates and postdocs interested in interdisciplinary research. The conference therefore aims to create an intellectually stimulating environment in which Ph.D. candidates and postdocs can interact with their peers from around the world who share this interest.

The first edition of the conference—organised by Uğur Aytaç, Gerrit Schaafsma, Lea Klarenbeek, and Alex Thinius—took place on May 23–24, 2019 at the Universiteit van Amsterdam with Simon Caney (Warwick), and Lisa Herzog (TU München) as keynote speakers.

The second edition of the conference—the present edition—was scheduled to take place on May 28–29, 2020 at the John Stuart Mill College, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Given the global health crisis, and the measures that have been put into place as a response to this, a physical conference could not have taken place as scheduled. We have therefore decided to go ahead with the conference in a virtual environment, with Laura Valentini (KCL), and Karuna Mantena (Columbia) as our keynote speakers.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



We are grateful for generous funding by the Amsterdam Centre for Political Thought, and the John Stuart Mill College at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Additionally, we want to acknowledge the support and guidance we have received from Enzo Rossi, Eric Schliesser, Johan Olsthoorn, Patrick Overeem, Phil Robichaud, Martin van Hees, and Ben Crum.

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AKSHATH JITENDRANATH

(AMSTERDAM)

Akshath is a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (or PPE) at the VU Amsterdam where he is also a Junior Lecturer in the PPE programme at the VU's John Stuart Mill College. Economists think he's a philosopher, and philosophers think he's an economist. He's just enjoying the schizophrenia in his doctoral work which is on rationality, and is at the intersection of the two disciplines. He is also an editor at the *Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics*.

E . W . T

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SANNE GROOTHUIS

(AMSTERDAM)

Sanne is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and Philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Her research investigates the role of racial and religious categories in counter-radicalisation policies of Western European states, taking Dutch and Swiss policies as case studies. Besides her Ph.D., Sanne works as a consultant in public security at TwynstraGudde.

E · W · L

THE ORGANISERS



STEFANO MERLO

(AMSTERDAM)

Stefano is a Junior Lecturer at the VU Amsterdam's John Stuart Mill College. He writes about the Economic and Monetary Union from a macroeconomic and philosophical perspective. He is applying republican political theory to the Eurozone to understand which principles of international justice should apply to a currency union.

E . W . T

THE ORGANISERS



MARINA UZUNOVA

(AMSTERDAM)

Marina is a PPE Ph.D. student and a Junior Lecturer at the John Stuart Mill College. Her research lies at the intersection of philosophy and economics, focusing on issues of power in general and structural power in particular. She is also an editor at the *Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics*.

E . W . T

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS



KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

SESSION 1: PUBLIC REASON

SESSION 2: (IM)MIGRATION

SESSION 3: REPUBLICANISM

SESSION 4: IDEOLOGY AND TIME

SESSION 5: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

SESSION 6: SURVEILLANCE AND EXPLOITATION

DISCUSSANTS AND CHAIRS

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS



28 May 2020

09:30–11:00 LAURA VALENTINI (LONDON)
On public identity
disempowerment

Chair *Akshath Jitendranath* (AMSTERDAM)



29 May 2020

15:30–17:00 KARUNA MANTENA (NEW YORK)
Gandhi and
the hazards of action

Chair *Marina Uzunova* (AMSTERDAM)



LAURA VALENTINI

(LONDON)

Professor Valentini's work is situated in the field of contemporary political theory and political philosophy. Her research interests include: global justice, democracy, freedom, human rights, political obligation, the methodology of political theory, and the relation between political theory, social ontology and the social sciences more broadly.

Professor Valentini holds a first degree ("laurea") in Political Science from Pavia University (Italy), and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Philosophy from University College London. She has been a Junior Research Fellow at The Queen's College (Oxford University), a postdoc at the Center for Human Values (Princeton University), a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at UCL, and till recently an Associate Professor of Political Science at LSE. She is now Professor of Philosophy, Politics and Economics at KCL.

E · W

ON PUBLIC IDENTITY DISEMPOWERMENT

It is well known that social disempowerment can *result from* the ascription of certain identities, such as gender, race, ethnic, or religious identities. In this paper, I put the spotlight on a related, but different form of disempowerment, which affects the processes *leading to* the ascription of those identities. This is the disempowerment suffered by those who are deprived of adequate control over how they are publicly perceived. I call it *public-identity disempowerment*. I offer a general framework for analysing this type of disempowerment, and discuss a particularly significant instance of it: *transparency-appraisal disempowerment*. I explain why transparency-appraisal disempowerment is wrongful, and show that it lies at the heart of otherwise rather different social phenomena, including bullying, cultural exclusion, statistical discrimination, and positive as well as negative stereotyping.



28 May, 2020, 9:30–11:00



KARUNA MANTENA

(NEW YORK)

Professor Karuna Mantena specializes in political theory with research interests in the theory and history of empire, South Asian intellectual history, and postcolonial democracy. Professor Mantena holds a B.Sc. (Economics) in International Relations from the London School of Economics (1995), an M.A. in Ideology and Discourse Analysis from the University of Essex (1996), and a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University (2004).

Her first book, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (2010), analyzed the transformation of nineteenth-century British imperial ideology. She is currently finishing a book on M. K. Gandhi and the politics of nonviolence, tentatively titled *Gandhi's Realism: Means and Ends in Politics*. She is also co-director of the International Conference for the Study of Political Thought.

E · W

GANDHI AND THE HAZARDS OF ACTION

Across the twentieth century, a whole range of Marxist, existentialist, progressive, anarchist, and anticolonial thinkers and activists wrestled with the legitimacy and efficacy of new forms of mass political action—such as the boycott, the general strike, as well as revolutionary violence. At the same time, theorists of action—such as Weber and Arendt—worried about the tragic, fragile, and unmasterable character of political action. In this talk, I place Gandhi’s conception of *satyagraha* (nonviolent action) within this broader global debate on the dilemmas of mass political action and suggest how *satyagraha* was supposed to mitigate and resolve some of the inherent hazards of political contestation and action.



29 May, 2020, 15:30–17:00

SESSION I:
PUBLIC REASON

Both papers take issues within public reason liberalism as their point of departure. Afnan deepens a well known problem by arguing that applications of this framework at the global level face an important dilemma. Kugelberg, on the other hand, responds to the criticism that this framework suffers from democratic deficits. He shows that this can be mitigated.



28 May 2020

11:15–12:45 Liberal global public reason:
Too thick or too thin

Maxmillian Afnan (LONDON)

Democratic deficits
and how to fix them

Henrik D. Kugelberg (OXFORD)

Discussant *Enzo Rossi* (AMSTERDAM)

Chair *Akshath Jitendranath* (AMSTERDAM)



MAXMILLIAN AFNAN
(LONDON)

Maximillian Afnan is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Government Department at the London School of Economics. Their thesis asks whether and how principles associated with deliberative democracy can be applied at the global level, and is supervised by Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. More broadly, their research focuses on theories of global democracy, comparative political theory, and the interaction between the two.

E . W

LIBERAL GLOBAL PUBLIC REASON: TOO THICK OR TOO THIN

Many of the most pressing policy challenges facing humanity—climate change, migration, disease management, and so on—cross national borders. As a result, it is widely thought that there are strong epistemic and moral reasons for conducting political deliberation at the supra-national level. Given this recognition, an important question arises:

What normative principles should govern the conduct of political deliberation in the supranational public sphere?

One prominent answer—especially within the liberal tradition—is by reference to a standard of global public reason. Theories of public reason specify what kinds of reasons and justifications may be legitimately advanced in public deliberation, as well as what modes of reasoning may permissibly be used to defend arguments in the public sphere. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, *by their own evaluative standards*, accounts of global public reason within the liberal tradition face an important dilemma. On the one hand, they seek to be expansive and rich enough to allow for the generation of globally applicable solutions to shared problems (desideratum 1). On the other hand, they seek to avoid imposing on diverse individuals and peoples policies which they could reasonably reject (desideratum 2). I argue, using only principles internal to their theories, that David Held's liberal cosmopolitan public reason is able to satisfy the first desideratum, but not the second, while John Rawls' liberal nationalist



28 May 2020, 11:15–12:45

Session 1: Public reason

Discussant: ENZO ROSSI (AMSTERDAM)

public reason can only attempt to satisfy the second by abandoning the first.

I begin by reconstructing a liberal cosmopolitan account of global public reason using David Held, before arguing that it is *parochial* and therefore runs afoul of the second desideratum. This is because the comprehensive liberal conception of autonomy—understood in terms of choosing and changing one’s commitments and living a reflective life—on which it is grounded is exactly the kind of culturally specific, metaphysically controversial, value which a non-liberal individual or political community might reasonably reject.

I then consider the response that, while this is a problem for comprehensive liberals such as Held, *political* liberalism can block this move because it is compatible with the full range of comprehensive doctrines found both within diverse contemporary societies, and across the world. To this response, I invoke a criterion which political liberals themselves propose to discriminate between theories of public reason: the ‘anti-sectarian desideratum’. I argue that, *even if* one believes that political liberalism avoids sectarianism at the domestic level, we have good reasons to believe that—given the diversity of public political cultures extant in the world—applying domestic theories of political liberalism globally would indeed be sectarian.

Liberal nationalist public reason, as exemplified by Rawls’ *The Law of Peoples*, attempts to circumvent the problem of parochialism by positing a much thinner set of liberal principles to form the basis of global public reason. I argue, however, that Rawls is only able to purchase this defence against the parochialism objection at the cost of either *incompleteness* or *plausibility in reflective equilibrium*, thus running afoul of the first desideratum.

The principles of the ‘law of peoples’ only allow justifications for policy that involve violating the political autonomy of a particular people on three grounds: to prevent international aggression, violations of human rights, or in response to humanitarian catastrophe.

C This means that Rawlsian global public reason does not have the conceptual resources to deal with a whole swathe of international political problems that are intrinsically global, but which cannot straightforwardly be described as issues of aggression, human rights, or humanitarian catastrophe. Using climate change as an example, I consider each of the principles of the ‘law of peoples’ in turn, arguing that—both individually and collectively—they do not contain the conceptual resources necessary to ground a global, coercively-backed framework regulating carbon emissions. I then consider the objection that this makes the ‘law of peoples’ not incomplete but merely deferential to the autonomy of individual peoples, responding that this move makes the theory implausible in reflective equilibrium. Either way, the theory does not satisfy desideratum 1.

Attempts to apply liberal theories of public reason at the global level thus face an important dilemma: either they are too thick (satisfying desideratum 1 but not 2), or too thin (satisfying 2 but not 1). Liberal cosmopolitanism grasps the first horn of the dilemma, and liberal nationalism grasps the second, but neither attempt to apply public reason liberalism to the international sphere is able to resolve this deep tension.



HENRIK D. KUGELBERG
(OXFORD)

Henrik D. Kugelberg is a D.Phil. Candidate at St Antony's College and a Stipendiary Lecturer in Political Theory at Mansfield College, University of Oxford. His thesis, supervised by David Miller and Zofia Stemplowska, is about understanding public reason liberalism as a theory of legitimacy for the real world. More broadly, his research focuses on the relationship between theories of democratic legitimacy, social choice theory, contemporary liberal political theory, public reason, and religion. He holds a M.Sc. in Political Theory from London School of Economics and a B.Sc. in Political Sciences from Uppsala University.

E . W . T

DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS AND HOW TO FIX THEM

From the very start, opponents to public reason liberalism have called the theory undemocratic. In the exchange between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, for instance, Habermas famously criticised the fact that on Rawls' account of public reason, basic liberties are 'withdrawn from the reach of democratic self-legislation'. Thus, Habermas argued, the writing and re-writing of the constitution cannot be open, transparent and—ultimately—democratic, since public reason 'generates a priority of liberal rights which demotes the democratic process to an inferior status'.

While this first version of the charge had some initial pull, contemporary proponents of public reason liberalism are unpersuaded by it. Jonathan Quong points out that, the 'objection is misguided', since 'certain fundamental liberal rights and principles – for example, free speech and freedom of religion – are beyond reasonable dispute'. It would, therefore, not be desirable to let democratic publics remove these freedoms, since doing so would be a serious violation of some of liberalism's central values. An idea of majoritarian rule without constitutional guarantees for citizens is not the kind of democratic autonomy that liberals value. The kind of democratic autonomy that liberals do value, it is said, is compatible with public reason liberalism. Indeed, some proponents hold it to be its central premise: laws and policies should—in some sense—be justified to all citizens who live under them. It is argued that this enables a kind of political autonomy—citizens are free in the sense that they live under laws that



28 May 2020, 11:15–12:45

Session I: Public reason

Discussant: ENZO ROSSI (AMSTERDAM)

they could have chosen themselves. Laws that are acceptable to all citizens are permissibly enforceable. This is the public justification principle.

There are two main ways of interpreting the public justification principle. The so-called consensus interpretation entails that acceptability demands that political decisions be justified with reasons that are normatively relevant for all citizens. The convergence model, on the other hand, holds that a law is justified if all citizens can accept it for their own, private, reasons. The differences between the two models have been analysed at great length, with nuanced and thoughtful interventions on both sides. What has remained unexplored, however, is the structural weakness that the most well-developed versions of both the consensus and the convergence view share. In what follows, I will argue that they are antidemocratic, not because they prioritise liberal rights, but because they fail to guarantee that citizens can hold their governments accountable.

To make the argument, I will re-describe the consensus and the convergence views in an unfamiliar way—as modes of making collective decisions. Doing so, I find that proponents of both views allow so-called incompletely theorised agreements for making democratic decisions. That is, they do not require legislators to agree on which reasons that justify a political decision, only that the political decision is justified. The consequence is that political decisions are not conversable—citizens cannot demand and challenge the reasons underpinning state action. This is worrying, because enabling the critical exchange of reasons is one of democracy's central values. Drawing on the discursive dilemma, a central finding from social choice theory, I show that collective decisions made like this will sometimes be irrational, which exacerbates the problem greatly.

I make three key interventions. First, I explain how political decisions that are made by incompletely theorised agreements are impossible to hold governments to account for. This result is signifi-

cant not just for public reason liberalism, but for any theory of democratic decision-making. Second, I demonstrate how this entails that we must choose between committing to the most influential views of public reason liberalism and upholding the opportunity for democratic accountability. I argue that we should opt for the latter, while changing our understanding of how public reason liberalism should operate. Instead of incompletely theorised agreements, we should demand conversable public decisions. In this way, it is always possible to point to a procedure-independent reason that justifies democratic decisions, and the reasoning of the state is public and contestable. Third, I explain how this, in turn, implies that only the consensus view can be salvaged—modifying the convergence view in the necessary way will inevitably open the door to an objectionable form of perfectionism.



ARISTEL SKRBIC

(LEUVEN)

Aristel Skrbic is an FWO Fellow and Ph.D. candidate at the Center for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, under the supervision of Professor Raf Geenens. His research stands at the crossroads of political and legal philosophy, combining critical and normative approaches. In his Ph.D. project, Aristel is developing an ideology critique of EU law on freedom of movement of people, with a focus on the ECJ and its adjudicative methods. This critical moment is in turn supplemented by a normative project which proposes a more equitable understanding and practice of free movement of people.

E . W

REASSESSING THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF RIGHTS DIFFERENTIATION FOR TEMPORARY WORKERS

This paper is an inquiry into the moral permissibility of rights differentiation for migrant workers employed in temporary labour programmes (TLPs). While most TLPs in the democratic Western states grant workers a package of rights comparable to domestic workers, they admit many fewer workers than the more restrictive TLPs practiced in states like Qatar or Singapore. The latter are widely condemned for violating workers' rights, as well as abusing their human rights. However, remittances from these TLPs contribute more towards global poverty eradication and reducing global inequality than all transfers from OECD countries to the Global South. This presents global egalitarians with a dilemma. From the standpoint of non-ideal theory, immigration is one of the few ways to advance global equality in the medium term. However, there is a widely recognised trade-off between the number of temporary workers admitted and the package of rights they receive. So, either we advocate for accepting more temporary workers with rights restrictions and so compromise on our liberal principles or we defend the current practice of Western states and thus fail to adequately meet our obligations of global justice.

Development economists such as Milanovic, Weyl, and Rodrik, are willing to consider rights restrictions in exchange for global justice gains. Some liberal authors, such as Miller and Stilz, also allow



28 May 2020, 13:45–15:15

Session 2: (Im)migration

Discussant: Tamar de Waal (AMSTERDAM)

C for rights restrictions since they consider the status of temporary workers as essentially contractual which means that in the absence of coercion they are allowed to forfeit (some of) their rights when signing up for a TLP. But the overwhelming consensus in the liberal and liberal egalitarian circles, ever since Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*, is that differentiation of rights between domestic and migrant temporary workers is morally impermissible. We think such a principled rejection of restrictive TLPs is too hasty. We advance two arguments against the dominant liberal position rejecting rights differentiation of any kind. We do this not to justify human rights violations in the Gulf States. Rather, our aim is to reframe the philosophical debate as a moral tension between persons' rights qua workers and their entitlements qua global citizens under conditions of extreme scarcity.

The first argument is internal to the Rawlsian framework. Some global egalitarians, such as Carens, ground their rejection of restrictive TLPs in the lexical priority between the first and second principle. Carens treats workers' rights as liberties falling under the first principle of justice, while diminishing global poverty and advancing global equality are expressions of the second principle. The rights/numbers trade-off is thus a conflict between liberty and equality, and the lexical priority of the former forbids us to trade liberties of temporary workers for increasing global equality. We want to challenge this framing of the trade-off and instead suggest the tension lies between two aspects of liberty itself. While *liberty* in Rawls's work is usually meant as a formal concept, the *worth of liberty* refers to the agent's actual ability to exercise this liberty. This complicates the principled rejection of restrictive TLPs since the conflict between the two aspects of liberty cannot be resolved abstractly but requires a stipulation about where the social minimum lies, and casts doubt on lexical priority under conditions of extreme scarcity. This suggests a more nuanced assessment of the permissibility of restrictive TLPs which takes into account the factual situation of the temporary workers.

The second argument is methodological, taking issue with one of the general orientations of contemporary analytic political theory, namely its anti-tragic stance. Global egalitarians such as Carens acknowledge a conflict between competing and incompatible obligations of domestic and global justice, but end up resolving it by establishing a hierarchy of obligations. A tragic conception of human action, on the other hand, tells us that in certain situations the conflict between various moral obligations cannot be solved. The basic proposition of tragedy is that whatever action we choose to take in such situations, we will have committed a serious moral wrong. While such a vision of the world is present in some disciplines such as international relations, it is usually ignored by international political theorists. We argue that approaching the conflict of obligations around TLPs from the tragic perspective would better capture the normative problem at stake. Just as a global egalitarian objects to the statist when they place requirements of domestic justice ahead of duties of global justice, so we ought to reject the framing of this conflict as one of lexical priority. Instead, we can acknowledge that either equal treatment of workers in receiving countries or the worth of liberty of those workers left behind in source countries will be compromised, and that this is a tragic moral choice for a global egalitarian.

C



LAURA SANTI AMANTINI

(GENOA)

Laura Santi Amantini is a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at the University of Genoa (North-Western Italian Philosophy Consortium). Her Ph.D. thesis, supervised by Professor Valeria Ottonelli, explores the grounds of the forced migration concept and what is owed to forced migrants. Laura has carried out part of her research as Visiting Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre of the University of Oxford and as Visiting Postgraduate Research Student at the University of Bristol. Along with her research on forced migration, she has also been working on populist anti-immigrant sentiments, assessing some implications they have for liberal ethics of migration.

E · W

WHY ARE FORCED MIGRANTS SPECIAL? THE DISTINCTIVE HARMS OF DISPLACEMENT

How theorists conceptualise ‘refugees’, ‘displaced persons’, ‘forced migrants’ or ‘necessitous migrants’ is largely influenced by the ethics of migration they endorse. For those who assume that receiving states normally have the right to exclude immigrants, the forcedness of movement matters to assess whether the moral claim to admission may exceptionally trump the right to exclude. By contrast, those who defend open borders or a human right to immigrate tend to challenge the distinctions among forced and voluntary migrants.

In this paper, I consider what makes forced migration harmful and distinctively different from voluntary migration. To do so, I do not proceed from a prior ethics of migration, nor do I begin from the issue of whether forced migrants should be given priority in immigration policies. Instead, I rely on empirical literature in forced migration studies, ranging from displacement triggered by conflict and violence to development induced and environmentally induced displacement and trafficking, to argue that both internally and internationally displaced people experience four distinctive kinds of harms connected with forced displacement.

Firstly, being forced to migrate results in a loss of control: this loss may affect control over one’s body, over one’s bodily movement, over one’s personal space and most intimate belongings. This may vary, depending upon the degree of coercion and abruptness involved. However, forced migration invariably implies a loss of control over one’s immediate future: while migration can indeed be an empowering experience if chosen as part of one’s life plan,



28 May 2020, 13:45–15:15

Session 2: (Im)migration

Discussant: Nanda Oudejans (AMSTERDAM)

forced displacement is experienced as a disruption of one's life plan.

C A second harm connected with forced displacement consists in the loss of one's Home environment. This is not limited to the house or dwelling: I conceive Home as a familiar environment where the person possesses sufficient social and cultural resources to perceive her personal identity as meaningful and to conceive future plans. This includes human relations, a set of well-known spatial landmarks, as well as predictable cultural and social conventions. Importantly, losing Home is harmful independently from both the subjective emotional attachments the person may have to that place and from the objective opportunities she enjoys: what matters is that the person is forcibly deprived of the environment she used to rely on. Furthermore, I do not endorse a 'sedentary' conception of the Home environment: indeed, I argue that even nomadic peoples move within a mobile Home environment and are harmed when displaced outside it.

Thirdly, forced migration involves a loss of social status and material wealth. Impoverishment is largely acknowledged in empirical literature: forced migrants lose their source of livelihoods and they usually leave behind most belongings, particularly when their move is abrupt. However, the loss of status does not simply follow from the loss of their source of livelihoods, and from the dependence upon aid to secure basic needs, but also from the loss of the social roles they used to have and from the loss of relevance of their skills and knowledge. Thus, even outside camps, forced migrants often experience marginalization and social exclusion, which may be exacerbated by the epistemic injustice of not being recognized as having been forced to migrate in that unfamiliar environment.

A fourth harm concerns the psychological impact of violent and traumatic experiences connected with forced displacement, which undermine forced migrants' mental wellbeing. While sometimes forced displacement may be an unintended outcome of violence,

violence itself may be finalized to expel undesired residents from a piece of land. Moreover, compared to other victims of violence, forced migrants experience distinctive psychological distress related to their move (e.g. caused by guilt or fear for those left behind, blame and stigmatization for having fled). It is important not to pathologize forced migrants, as if they all developed mental disorders. However, some do suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety related to their forced displacement. Moreover, the moral harm involved violent and traumatic experiences remains, whether or not this gives rise to medical conditions.

In sum, forced migrants (both those displaced within and across borders) experience distinctive harms, specifically related to forced displacement. Clarifying such distinctive harms has important normative implications, because it helps to show why forced migrants should be set apart from other people on the move, when assessing what is owed to them.

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SESSION 3:
REPUBLICANISM

In this panel one paper challenges republican political theory, while the other one applies it to a contemporary debate. McHugh offers an account of structural domination that goes beyond the paradigmatic slave-master case. Pala describes instead a republican approach to human rights that imposes clear duties on the international community.



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- 15:30–17:00 Toward an appropriate
 republican regime of
 human rights
Davide Pala (MANCHESTER)
- Rescuing the dominator
 in cases of systemic domination
Hannah McHugh (LONDON)
- Discussant *Dorothea Gädeke* (UTRECHT)
- Chair *Stefano Merlo* (AMSTERDAM)



DAVIDE PALA

(MANCHESTER)

Davide Pala is a Ph.D. researcher at the University of Manchester and works within the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT). His interests focus on international political theory. In particular, in his dissertation he is trying to develop a republican approach to human rights and to show its institutional implications. His research is supervised by Miriam Ronzoni and Christian Schemmel.

E . W

TOWARD AN APPROPRIATE REPUBLICAN REGIME OF HUMAN RIGHTS

For republicans institutions play a *constitutive* role vis-à-vis republican freedom, namely, freedom as non-domination. Freedom as non-domination, in other words, comes into existence only when certain appropriate institutions are in place. The same, I submit, also holds for what I call *basic non-domination*. Basic non-domination is a kind of republican freedom whereby to count as *minimally* free individuals ought to have a *secure access* to the object of those human rights that would enable them, *qua* citizens, to set up a republic in the first place. Basic non-domination is, as such, a basic citizenship-status made up of human rights. Hence, this gives rise to the following question: what institutions are necessary to realise and securely protect the human rights that compose it? Put simply, how should a republican regime of human rights look like? In this paper, I show that republicans have not provided a satisfactory answer to this question so far. A new republican regime of human rights, which I outline at the end of the paper, is thus needed.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I consider the republican regime of human rights advocated by *standard internationalism*. Namely, an international scenario made up of free—that is, non-dominating and non-dominated—states that bear the primary duty to realise and protect the human rights essential for enjoying basic non-domination, but whose power over them is constrained by some not fully binding international institutions. I then show that this



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regime is unable to deliver basic non-domination as a secure status. Indeed, within it the *trumping* function of republican human rights, which requires that when violations occur external intervention in states' internal affairs do take place, is not acknowledged. Moreover, this regime is not able to effectively cope with those *global dynamics* falling out of state individual control (for example, climate change) which, however, enable a variety of agents to violate human rights.

Second, I focus on the decentralised and multilevel human-rights regime supported by *transnationalism*. Roughly, transnationalism maintains that the duty to realise and protect basic non-domination should fall on all those actors that are party of interest when human rights are at stake, and are capable of discharging it. None, however, will have final authority over the formulation and enforcement of human rights so as to avoid any concentration of power. *Contra* this, I argue that, in the lack of any final authority in matter of human-rights protection, it is not possible to either avoid hardly solvable conflicts of competences when human rights are violated, which would leave insecure basic non-domination; or to enforce human rights in a legitimate—that is, non-dominating—manner, namely, in the name of an omnilateral as opposed to unilateral will.

Third, I analyse the world republic advocated by *political cosmopolitanism*. I concede that a world republic, given its sovereign power, would be capable of effectively constraining state power over human rights and coping with those dynamics over which states have little control but that enable many actors to violate basic non-domination. I contend, however, that this human-rights regime rests upon, as for its legitimacy, the unfeasible idea of a *global demos*. Moreover, it is not well-equipped to address the risk of *global despotism*.

Finally, profiting from the negative as well positive lessons learnt previously, I argue that if there is a republican regime of human rights that is appropriate to the cause of basic non-domination, it will have to be *constitutional internationalism*. Namely, a

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C regime that, first, grants sovereign states a primary role in matter of human-rights protection (*internationalism*). And yet, second, it constrains state power over human rights through some fully binding and democratically reformed international and supranational institutions, which, importantly, do intervene when states fail nonetheless (*constitutionalism*). This regime, third, also assigns to certain international institutions some primary duties grounded by the human rights composing basic non-domination, and as for them treats states simply as their “dischargers” (*minimal* and *non-statist federalism*). Crucially, nonetheless, this regime restricts, constrains and counterbalances the power of these institutions in such a way that the risk of engendering domination, let alone giving rise to a world state, is averted. Constitutional internationalism, finally, is legitimised by a plurality of state-demos (*demos-cratic legitimacy*).



HANNAH MCHUGH

(LONDON)

Hannah McHugh is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Theory at University College London under the supervision of Richard Bellamy and Emily McTernan. She is focussing on the interaction between republicanism, structural injustice and social inequalities. The project of her thesis is to show that republicanism can account for these matters of concern to relational egalitarians and thus form a complete theory of social justice. Hannah has an academic background in law and legal theory and a professional background in international advocacy. She curates and edits the political philosophy blog *What To Do About Now?*.

E . W . T

RESCUING THE DOMINATOR IN CASES OF SYSTEMIC DOMINATION

The classic cases of domination, like the relationship between master and slave, encourage us to think of domination as a dyadic relationship between two agents. Yet very rarely does domination take place without support from structural factors, be they middle agents, ideologies or other socio-economic factors. Indeed, in many instances we may not know who our dominator is, or even that they have the potential to interfere in our choices. For example, the single mother in the US who is working three jobs, yet still struggles to pay her rent and thus is at risk of homelessness; who precisely, if anyone at all, in this case dominates her? Some, when considering such cases typically raised by relational theorists such as Young, have even abandoned any reference to agents in their notion of domination, suggesting, for instance, that an ideology itself can dominate. This type of structural view aligns with sociological theorists and those that emphasise structural injustices such as that of oppression. However, it is in conflict with a core tenet of Pettit-style republicanism; whereby a dominating agent is a necessary condition for domination. Lovett has attempted to rescue the agential nature of republicanism against this critique, however, I show that his account, which requires a strictly defined relationship between dominator and dominated, narrows too greatly the remit of republicanism and cannot rescue the theory from this sociological critique.



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However, this paper rescues the idea of a dominator: i.e. that there must be some agent who dominates. Moreover, I do so in a way that accommodates the complex interaction between agent and structure in producing domination. This allows for a conception of domination that is sensitive to structural factors (which may be the source of power of dominators) yet does not lose the core elements of the paradigmatic cases on which traditional neo-republicanism is based; the relationship between master and slave. First, I defend adopting an agent-relative view of domination, resisting allowing for domination by structures themselves, on the grounds that at the heart of a concept of domination is the problematic imposition of an arbitrary will, such that an agent is required. Second, I propose a widening of the definition of a social relationship within an agent-relative account of domination, as compared to Lovett's approach, to incorporate 'partially strategic' relationships, in order to account for less proximate relationships of domination as occur in complex systems. Partially strategic relationships, as I define them, are those in which only one party must act strategically; only one party is aware of the strategic nature of the relationship; and the epistemic condition is that the stronger agent must know that their actions could arbitrarily affect a potential agent or group of agents. Third, I will defend this basis for an agential definition of domination, first, against the criticism that it widens domination too greatly, and, second, on the grounds that it provides a better critical and social account of the interaction between structures and agents within systems of domination that affect our everyday lives than existing sociological accounts on the one hand, and current agential republican accounts such as that of Lovett on the other hand.

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ADRIAN KREUTZ
(AMSTERDAM)

Adrian Kreutz took a B.A. in Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, an M.Litt. in Logic at St. Andrews, and an M.Res. on a doctoral scheme in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. In 2019 he was a visiting researcher at Kyoto University. Right now, he is finishing his M.Sc. thesis in Political Science at the UvA, writing on Radical Realism under the supervision of Enzo Rossi. He holds offers from Oxford, Cambridge, KCL and the UvA for further Ph.D. studies.

E . W . T

WHENCE AND WHITHER GENEALOGICAL IDEOLOGY-CRITIQUE?

There are various ways in which political theory and ideology can relate. One way is to think of ideology and political theory as *inseparable*, and thus *integrated*, theoretical pursuits. Skinner (1966), for example, thinks of ideology as a verbal short-hand for political theory; Gramsci ([1929–35] 2011) effectively gave center stage to the study of ideology (as hegemony) in political theorizing. Another way to think about that relation is embodied in Vincent's (2012) *segregation thesis* which, in abbreviated form, says that ideology and political theory are distinct. Filling in the details myself, the position to be outlined here will take ideology and political theory to be distinct in virtue of the former being a *subject of study* in some *methodological approach* to the *field of inquiry* that is the latter.

The concept of 'usefulness' shall be defined as the level of contribution to the overall success of a theory, measured along the usual lines of theory choice, i.e. *fit with the data*, *explanatory potential*, *simplicity*, *etc* (cf. Quine and Ullian 1978). Whether the concept of ideology in political theory is *useful*, or not, thus depends on whether including/studying it contributes to the overall success of *a* (deliberately singular) political theory. That, in turn, largely depends on methodological and conceptual issues.

Hence, I take the title question to evoke a comparative evaluation of *methodological approaches* in political theory, not an evaluation of political theory as a discipline in comparison with other relevant



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Session 4: Ideology and time

Discussant: Annelien de Dijn (UTRECHT)

disciplines such as psychology, sociology, etc. As I lack the space to make comprehensive comparative claims, it must suffice to introduce one such combination of methodological and conceptual views, namely that of ideology as the *default mode of political thought* and the *realist approach* to political theory, on which ideology is indeed a *useful* concept.

The concept of ideology I want to suggest is reminiscent of Freedman's definition (1998) of ideology, as well as Geertz's (1993) semiotic approach. The *default mode* approach views ideology as the *ordinary epistemic default mode* through which individuals and groups deliberately or unintendedly understand, and on the basis of which they act upon, the political sphere—a definition which is *prima facie* neutral on whether ideological thought is distorted in the Marxian sense. It is a definition that exposes ideology as a distinctive force that shapes real politics, and through which the agent becomes a *zoon politicon* in the first place

The independence of the concept of *ordinary epistemic default mode* from moral values puts it behind the boundaries which Nozick (1974, 6) drew around moralistic political theory, as the moralist is usually not concerned with the profane. For the moralist, then, the *default mode* concept of ideology cannot be considered *useful*. Defenders of the realist side of this Methodenstreit maintain that political theory should be concerned with the distinctive forces of actual politics (cf. Williams 2005). If ideology is the default mode of political thought, and political thought is supposed to be a distinctive force of actual politics, then realists should consider the concept of ideology *useful*, as its inclusion and study is integral to the realists' methodological agenda and pertains, *inter alia*, to the points *fit with the data* and *explanatory potential*.

An answer to the question of usefulness thus depends on choices in methodology and conceptualization—this is the level of analysis on which this question can reasonably be posed and has to be evaluated pointwise. A generalized answer, one that speaks for political theory as methodologically homogenous discipline, may

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not be possible. The answer to the title question is, as so often: ‘it depends on what you mean by . . .’.

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JOSHUA FOLKERTS

(ROSTOCK)

Joshua Folkerts is a Ph.D. candidate at Rostock University (Germany) and a college member of the DFG-graduate college “Deutungsmacht”. His research interests lie in the fields of political theory and history of ideas. He has published articles on the role of political myth in the English Civil War and the historical context of Rawls’ *Theory of Justice*. In his Ph.D. thesis he seeks to propose a theory of interpretative power (*Deutungsmacht*) as well as to analyse the development of the interpretations of social problems through time. The thesis is supervised by the late Professor Yves Bizeul and Professor Jörn Dosch.

E · W

INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIAL QUESTIONS THROUGH TIME: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE WELFARE

State welfare proves to be a powerful instrument for economic equalisation as well as social integration. Among those affected by measures of state welfare a context is created that possesses a strong levelling effect on its members, uniting them into an arbitrary yet inclusive group of welfare recipients setting aside existing differences. At the same time state welfare can have an exclusionary effect concerning those who stand outside this constructed group. It is argued that the definition of the welfare group as well as the form and extent of state welfare regarding the principles of freedom, justice, and solidarity depends on the interpretation (*Deutung*) of the social problems present in the respective society. The theory of interpretative power (*Deutungsmacht*) claims that political answers always exist in a context of conflicting interpretations of the problems at hand. For interpretations are by no means just arbitrary constructions that can be deliberately changed. They significantly influence the belief system of the people affected by them. They let people see and perceive different things. Power of interpretation as a 'soft' form of power modally influences the actions of humans, predefining epistemic and normative interpretations that constitute a space of existing options for thinking, perceiving and acting. The ideas conveyed by them, in a Weberian sense, lay the 'tracks' in



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which actions seem possible or impossible. They act as an enabler or inhibitor by putting certain options into the realm of perception in the first place. What is perceived as a social problem is not obvious but subject to the interpretations that are in a hegemonic position at the time and place the problems arise. Situations that are not perceived as a social problem and affected individuals that are not interpreted as belonging to the solidary welfare group do not cause an immediate reaction of the society or the state.

In the ancient Athenian Polis, the social question was interpreted as a question of political participation of the full citizens. Through land distribution and diets their democratic participation was made possible. In contrast, the concerns of the majority of the population, comprising women, slaves, and metics, did not fall into the discourse of the social question and were excluded from politics. In the Middle Ages those affected by poverty were integrated into the rigid social order. In the hegemonic Christian system of belief, however, their poverty was interpreted as God-given. Therefore, the resulting church welfare as well as the Christian economy of salvation could only alleviate but not eliminate the problems. A distinction was drawn between the deserving and the undeserving poor as well as the apostolic poor who chose this way of life. Though universally encompassing in its aspiration the Christian welfare strictly distinguished between alms-givers and recipients ordered by their deservingness. With the modern age, increasingly liberal interpretations gained power that understood the social question as a purely individual problem. Against the background of contractarianism, possessive individualism, and Protestant work ethics as well as in interaction with the emerging nation states, a coercive disciplining of the poor began urging them to work and acquire property. Interpreting poverty as a purely individual problem caused by corrupt or misled morals severely hindered the development of a solidary community that could have led to a comprehensive state welfare.

The proposed presentation seeks to show the interpretations of social problems through the ages and how the way state welfare built on these interpretations results in inclusive or exclusionary consequences. Implications for more recent cases might be drawn from the still prevalent dominance of elitist democratic, religious or classical liberal belief systems and their influence on welfare.

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SESSION 5:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

This session is about political power and its relation to merit and accountability. Chan defends an account of the former within the context of democratic institutions, broadly construed. Jakobi, on the other hand, analyses the specific case of lottocratic systems and what these entail with respect to the latter relation between power and electoral accountability.



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- 11:15–12:45 Meriting political power
William Chan (WARWICK)
- Control and accountability
 in lottocracy
Julia Jakobi (HAMBURG)
- Discussant *Gordon Arlen* (AMSTERDAM)
- Chair *Marina Uzunova* (AMSTERDAM)



WILLIAM CHAN
(WARWICK)

William Chan is a Ph.D. candidate in Politics and International Studies at University of Warwick. His thesis, supervised by Matthew Clayton and Michael Saward, aims to explain why political power should be distributed meritocratically. He also argues that the core legislative positions should be distributed by the combination of democratic elections and meritocratic sortition (i.e. random selection among a group of qualified candidates, by virtue of their socio-economic circumstances, expertise, experience and so on), while both institutional mechanisms are justified by appeal to meritocratic reasons. More broadly, his research encompasses contemporary theories of democracy, meritocracy and political justification.

MERITING POLITICAL POWER

Many political roles, except those in the core executive and legislature of established democracies, are distributed according to merit-based criteria. These jobs, including civil servants, technical advisors for the head of government and so on, allow their occupants to exercise political power. Meanwhile, we often make merit claims about politicians: to say that Trump does not merit the US presidency, for instance, many are to imply that he does not merit the political power he has as a president. We also resent the fact that political power is distributed to those who do not merit it.

These facts create a bunch of interesting normative questions. First, whereas some political roles allowing their occupants to exercise political power are distributed according to merit, which conception of merit should inform the distributive procedure of those roles? Second, to justifiably claim that a person does (not) merit the political power she has, which idea of merit ought we to have in mind? Third, what underpins our resentment against people who, in our view, do not merit their political power? To offer a *pro tanto* response to these questions, we need at least a sound conception of merit with respect to political power. In particular, this conception will enable us, in Miller's (2001, 178) terms, to 'have a proper measuring rod against which to gauge social realities, saying how far they do or do not conform to meritocratic criteria'. However, although much has been said about what makes someone deserving or meritorious of such social goods as jobs and rewards, the suitable basis for merit claims to power rarely invites serious contemplation.



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Session 5: Power and accountability

Discussant: Gordon Arlen (AMSTERDAM)

My aim in this article is to defend an Aristotelian basis for merit claims to political power. I follow the Aristotelian assumption that merit claims to goods must be based on the *characteristic function* of those goods. The characteristic function of political power, I argue, is *justice realisation*: the basis for merit claims to political power should appeal to considerations on whether this function can be best fulfilled.

C Here is my plan. In section 1, I distinguish between three general bases for merit claims to political power: The Aristotelian View, The Qualities-Based View and The Consequentialist View. The Aristotelian View focuses on the instrumental relationship between an agent and the characteristic function of power; The Qualities-Based View rests merit claims on one's exhibition of certain qualities, *whether or not* those qualities serve any ends; The Consequentialist View rests merit claims on the state of affairs produced by giving power to an agent. The Qualities-Based and Consequentialist Views, I argue, run into serious difficulties.

Section 2 concentrates on The Aristotelian View. There I argue that the characteristic function of power should be *justice realisation*, because (a) our deep concern for justice commits us to the view that the worth of political power is largely attached to its just exercise, and (b) claims to power must be based on considerations that everyone, subject to that power, can reasonably accept, whereas considerations of justice meet this requirement. I also distinguish between two varieties of The Aristotelian View: The Macro-Instrumental View and The Micro-Instrumental View. The Macro-View says that:

P merits (a specific share of) political power (more than *Q*), if assigning (that share of) power to *P* (rather than *Q*) will better realise the demands of justice overall.

The Micro-View says that:

P merits (a specific share of) political power (more than *Q*), if *P* has a set of qualities enabling herself to use (that share of power) to realise the demands of justice (better than *Q*).

I argue that The Macro-View is a better interpretation of The Aristotelian View, since it avoids three important objections to The Micro-View: *The Irrationality Objection*, *The Indifference Objection*, and *The Trade-off Objection*. The Irrationality Objection says that merit claims based on The Micro-View signal a weird kind of irrationality; The Indifference Objection says that The Micro-View is indifferent to the history of an agent's qualities, namely how those qualities came about; The Trade-off Objection says that The Micro-View is possibly subject to the difficult choice between meritocracy and equality.

In section 3, I refute two common criticisms of The Macro-View: *The Democratic Objection* and *The Unaptness Objection*. According to The Democratic Objection, since justice requires that political power be distributed equally, either merit claims to power are not worth the candle, or The Macro-View leads to the absurd conclusion that every citizen is equally meritorious of power. According to The Unaptness Objection, The Macro-View, in certain cases, fails to bring out the unaptness of an individual to have power.

In the final section, I close by discussing two themes: (1) the proper status of political virtues, namely the virtues that we usually think exercisers of political power should exhibit, in merit claims to power, and (2) how we should respond to the interesting normative questions noted at the beginning of this abstract. I utilise the contrast between the *justificatory* and *indicative* values in my concluding remarks.

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JULIA JAKOBI

(HAMBURG)

Julia Jakobi has completed a B.A. in International Business Administration, a B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science and an M.A. in Philosophy. Since 2018, she is doing her Ph.D. in Political Philosophy at the University of Hamburg, supervised by Junior Professor Moritz Schulz and Professor Matthew Braham. Her thesis is on the democratic potential of *lottocracy*. Lottocracy is a political system which replaces elections by a lottery selection of politicians, such that every citizen has the chance to be selected as a member of the parliament. Broadly speaking, she examines to what extent lottocracy satisfies the requirements and virtues of a desirable democratic political system.

E . W

CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOTTOCRACY

Within the last years, some political philosophers have proposed systems which employ *lottery selection* of citizens as politicians instead of *ballot voting*. The proponents argue, amongst others, that such systems could reduce dependencies between politicians and the economy, ensure a demographic representation of the society, and avoid the problem of (rational) voter ignorance (Guerrero 2014).

In my talk, I address one concern which is raised against all proposals of lottocratic systems and which has not been answered yet: the lack of mechanisms of accountability in lottocracies. It is one of the most basic assumptions of democracy that the ultimate power, the control over politicians, should be in the hands of the people. In a lottocracy, people would no longer have the possibility to elect the politicians they want to be represented by. Neither would they have the possibility to sanction unlikeable behaviour by not re-electing politicians. In my talk, I examine whether lottocracy can be called democratic and a considerable alternative political system despite the lack of such control mechanisms.

I begin by distinguishing two control functions elections are claimed to have: (i) a forward-directed transmission of a concrete mandate, and (ii) a backwards-directed control mechanism to hold political agents accountable for their behaviour (i.a. Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 2009). Second, I discuss three recent proposals which analyse whether and how lottocracy might establish sufficient accountability between citizens and their representatives. Finally, I argue that lottocracy would not have to be justified for not estab-



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Session 5: Power and accountability

Discussant: Gordon Arlen (AMSTERDAM)

lishing mechanisms to *sanction* politicians retrospectively, since it focuses on the *selection* of suitable candidates. I point out that, nevertheless, any democratic political system requires a possibility for the citizens to influence the subjects of political discussion and propose to implement elections on *topics*, combined with a lottery-selection of politicians. In what follows, I will briefly elaborate on step two and three of my talk.

C In a recent volume on *Legislature by Lot* (Gastil and Wright 2019), Brett Hennig (2019) argues that lottocracy could establish accountability between politicians and citizens better than electoral democracy, since it would build on more important accountability mechanisms such as manifestations, free media coverage and an independent jurisdiction. I object that although these are important institutions for establishing accountability, they are not sufficient to do so without institutionalized, frequent and binding expressions of opinion, such as elections. Jane Mansbridge (2019) suggests a more modest defence of accountability in sortition-based systems. She argues that accountability should rather be understood as explaining the reasons for one's actions than as being sanctioned for certain behaviour. Here, I counter that what lacks in such deliberative accounts is a binding influence of the citizens on the subject matters of politics. Tom Malleson (2019) argues that by influencing the selection process, people would to a certain extent have influence on the composition of the assembly and thus on the represented opinions. Again, I object that this does not suffice as a mechanism to transform citizen opinions into binding influence on politicians.

In order to establish how lottocracy might, without elections of politicians, bring about popular control by the people, I begin by justifying why the pure selection account, defended by Jane Mansbridge (Mansbridge 2019), is applicable to the selection of politicians. I argue that the lottocratic system would be less dependent on retrospective accountability mechanisms for two reasons: (1) The randomly selected members of the parliament would be replaced every three to four years by a new lottery selection; there-

fore, no mechanism to prevent the re-election of unresponsive or egoistically behaving politicians would be needed. (2) Within lottocracies, the concept of representation would be rather demographic than mandate-based. While in electoral democracies politicians ought to represent the interests of their electorate, in a lottocracy politicians are meant to represent the interests of people from similar demographic groups. I conclude by arguing that the pure lottery selection of politicians, although it might ensure a descriptive representation of the citizenry, disenfranchises the citizenry from political participation. I propose that implementing elections of *topics* rather than of politicians might overcome this lack of influence, while at the same time keeping up the advantages of abolishing the election of politicians.

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SESSION 6: SURVEILLANCE AND EXPLOITATION

Starting from Marxist political theory, this session focuses on increasing our understanding of economic relations within contemporary society. Whereas Venkatesh addresses a new type of industry initiated by/in/during the digital era, Richard questions recent neoclassical accounts of exploitation, highlighting the absurd conclusions following from them.



29 May 2020

- 13:45–15:15 Surveillance capitalism:
 A Marx-inspired account
 Nikhil Venkatesh (LONDON)
- Exploitation
 as price disequilibrium
 Stanislas Richard (BUDAPEST)
- Discussant *Nicholas Vrousalis* (ROTTERDAM)
- Chair *Sanne Groothuis* (AMSTERDAM)



NIKHIL VENKATESH
(LONDON)

Nikhil Venkatesh is a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy at University College London. He is supervised by Joe Horton, Veronique Munoz-Darde and Ulrike Heuer. His Ph.D. work primarily focuses on the foundations and implications of utilitarianism, the issues associated with aggregation and collective action, and objections to utilitarianism from integrity, equality and ‘the separateness of persons’. He is also interested in the nature of normativity and morality, and in Marxism and socialist strategy.

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SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: A MARX-INSPIRED ACCOUNT

Some of the world's most powerful corporations practise what Shoshana Zuboff (2015, 2019) calls 'surveillance capitalism'. The core of their business is harvesting, analysing and selling data about the people who use their products. In Zuboff's view, the first corporation to engage in surveillance capitalism was Google, followed by Facebook; recently, firms such as Microsoft and Amazon have pivoted towards such a model. In this paper, I suggest that Karl Marx's analysis of the relations between industrial capitalists and workers is closely analogous to a story we can tell about the relations between surveillance capitalists and users.

The analogy, in short, is this. Just as workers are driven to sell their labour-power to industrial capitalists by their need for material subsistence, which they cannot meet alone, users have a need for social participation, which they cannot meet alone, and which drives them to sell their data to surveillance capitalists. Just as industrial capitalists relieve the workers' needs with wages, surveillance capitalists relieve users' needs with access to their platforms. Rather than producing by combining labour-power with capital, they combine users' data with their machine intelligence and the data of other users to create products that they sell (typically to advertisers). The sale price commanded by such products outstrips the cost to the firms of providing users with access to their platforms, so surveillance capitalists profit from the interaction.

Furthermore, three normatively problematic aspects Marx found in industrial capitalism—alienation, exploitation and accumulation—



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reappear in surveillance capitalism, albeit in different forms. Under industrial capitalism, for Marx, workers are alienated from their capacity to work, the products of their work, and their employers. Under surveillance capitalism, users are alienated from their behaviour, the products of this behaviour, and the surveillance capitalists on whom they rely. Their behaviour—every click, like, purchase and friendship—becomes a commodity, data, which surveillance capitalists transform into a product that is sold to firms that users may never directly interact with, and certainly do not profit from. The surveillance capitalists themselves do not care whether what happens on their platforms is good or bad, whether messages are true or false, whether a status update announces a marriage or a death. The people who own and manage these firms thus have the indifferent, alienated relationship with their users as capitalists have with their workers.

The industrial capitalist's exploitation of the worker is associated with two features: (1) the worker's needs can only be relieved by making a deal with the capitalist; (2) this deal benefits the capitalist at some cost to the worker. In the case of the user and surveillance capitalism, the need is not (as it is for the worker) subsistence but social participation. Surveillance capitalists profit. The cost, to the user, comes in two forms: the first is the alienation described above; the second is a cost relative to the possible world in which surveillance capitalist platforms are owned by users themselves. If they had control of the platforms that facilitate social participation, they could meet their social needs in such an unalienated way. There would be no harvesting of data, or if there were it could be used to improve their lives; the platforms themselves would be designed not to maximise data harvesting but for their good; they would know the owners of the platforms, because they would be themselves.

Accumulation occurs in industrial capitalism as firms reinvest profits derived from labour into their capital, increasing its value. The capital of the surveillance capitalist is machine intelligence—the software that uses personal data to predict future behaviour.

C Because it is intelligent (that is, it learns), the more data it receives, the more accurate its predictions become (Zuboff 2019, 95). Machine intelligence fed on more data, therefore, is more valuable. Thus, for surveillance capitalists, accumulation—the ever-increasing value of their capital—comes through having access to more data. There is an important difference here. The industrial capitalist has to invest his profit into his capital to increase its value. Machine intelligence grows in value simply in virtue of having access to more data. There is therefore something more automatic about accumulation under surveillance capitalism: it is as if a machine in a factory grew in value simply because more workers had worked on it.

I draw heavily on Zuboff's work in drawing these parallels. However, my Marx-inspired account of surveillance capitalism differs from hers over the nature of the exchange between users and surveillance capitalists. For Zuboff, this is akin either to robbery or the gathering of raw materials; on the Marx-inspired account it is a voluntary sale. This difference has important implications for the question of how to resist surveillance capitalism. Most significantly, making the consent of users a condition for surveillance capitalists to appropriate their data will not be adequate to protect users from being alienated and exploited, nor to prevent the accumulation of value in the hands of surveillance capitalists. I conclude by describing two alternative ways of resisting what Zuboff calls the 'coup from above' (2019, chap. 18) perpetrated by surveillance capitalists.

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STANISLAS RICHARD

(BUDAPEST)

Stanislas Richard is a Ph.D. candidate (fourth year) in Political Theory at the Central European University, where he is supervised by Janos Kis, and visiting fellow at the Institute für Wissenschaft vom Menschen in Vienna. Stan's primary research interests are theories of exploitation from a liberal and libertarian perspective as the political philosophy of work.

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EXPLOITATION AS PRICE DISEQUILIBRIUM

This paper tries to determine how plausible neoclassical understandings of exploitation can be as an operative political concept—that is one that analyses economic relations from the point of view of justice. I will focus on the accounts of exploitation that see it as a price disequilibrium which still produce consumer surplus on both sides, and specifically the influential account offered by Alan Wertheimer (and to a lesser extent, by Hillel Steiner).

I show that his account leads to counter intuitive or bizarre judgements on the relations between labour and capital in the capitalist political economy. I discuss two of them.

The first is related to the so called ‘theory of the firm’ in mainstream economics. Since Ronald Coase, the capitalist firm is conceived as a legal entity that suspends economic competition between productive agents for the sake of efficiency gains (in the world of Coase’s, it replaces markets where markets cannot exist). This means that wages within the firm are necessarily higher, or at least follow a different distributive pattern, than the ones that would obtain if relations of production were competitive. Following Wertheimer, this would lead to the conclusion that labour exploits capital, and that labourers exploit each other’s.

The second odd conclusion relies on that exploitation is a moralised concept, that is a concept used to make value judgements on a given type of interaction. Any account of exploitation therefore grounds a duty to avoid the type of interactions (economic or else) that it has identified as exploitative. In the framework offered by



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Wertheimer, and following the above, economic agents have a duty not to incorporate and to maintain market-like productive relations, despite the ridiculously high costs of transactions and surge in inefficiency that discharging such a duty would entail.

These judgements, however, are totally consistent with dominant neoclassical analyses of labour markets. The Shapiro–Stiglitz model or the Insider-outsider theory of employment consider for example that the existence of involuntary unemployment is the proof of an excessively high cost of labour, meaning that the workers who are currently employed reap a wage that is higher than the market clearing rate. What makes these judgements odd is simply that they give a normative dimension to the limited and empirical point of view of standard labour economics. A normative theory of exploitation needs to take a broader perspective, which equilibrium-based accounts inherently lack. Exploitation theorists should be more than the normative clerks of neoclassical economists.

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DISCUSSANTS AND CHAIRS



Discussants

- Session 1: ENZO ROSSI (AMSTERDAM)
- Session 2: TAMAR DE WAAL (AMSTERDAM)
NANDA OUDEJANS (AMSTERDAM)
- Session 3: DOROTHEA GÄDEKE (UTRECHT)
- Session 4: ANNELIEN DE DIJN (UTRECHT)
- Session 5: GORDON ARLEN (AMSTERDAM)
- Session 6: NICHOLAS VROUSALIS (ROTTERDAM)



Guest chairs

- Session 2: YARA AL SALMAN (UTRECHT)
- Session 4: UĞUR AYTAÇ (AMSTERDAM)

SESSION I:
PUBLIC REASON



DISCUSSANT:
ENZO ROSSI
(AMSTERDAM)

Enzo Rossi is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, the co-editor of the *European Journal of Political Theory*, and the principal investigator of the Dutch National Science Organisation-funded Vidi project 'Legitimacy Beyond Consent'. His main focus is the relation between the descriptive and the normative study of society.

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SESSION 2:
(IM)MIGRATION



DISCUSSANT:
TAMAR DE WAAL
(AMSTERDAM)

Tamar de Waal is assistant professor in legal and political theory at the Amsterdam Law School of the University of Amsterdam. Her dissertation *Conditional Belonging: A Legal-philosophical Inquiry into Integration Requirements for Immigrants in Europe* (2017) won the VWR-prize for best dissertation in legal philosophy in the Netherlands and Belgium. She has published articles in, among others, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *Comparative Migration Studies* and *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review*. In 2021, her first monograph will be published by Hart Publishing.

SESSION 2:
(IM)MIGRATION



DISCUSSANT:
NANDA OUDEJANS
(AMSTERDAM)

Nanda Oudejans teaches philosophy of law at the University of Amsterdam and is affiliated to the Paul Scholten Centre for Jurisprudence. She has worked as a senior advisor on statelessness at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. Her dissertation, *Asylum: A Philosophical Inquiry into the International Protection of Refugees*, was in the field of legal and political philosophy. Oudejans' publications on refugees and migration are in *Political Theory*, *Constellations*, the *Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy* and the *Melbourne Journal of International Law*.

SESSION 2:
(IM)MIGRATION



CHAIR:
YARA AL SALMAN
(UTRECHT)

Yara Al Salman is a Ph.D. candidate in political philosophy at Utrecht University. Her dissertation research is about the idea of group ownership and its value for a just society. Yara has an M.Sc. degree in Political Theory (with distinction) from the London School of Economics.

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SESSION 3:
REPUBLICANISM



DISCUSSANT:
DOROTHEA GÄDEKE
(UTRECHT)

Dr. Dorothea Gädeke is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy. Prior to joining Universiteit Utrecht in September 2018 she worked at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Germany. Dorothea's research focuses on Republicanism and structural injustices, power and democracy, especially with regard to development and the relations between the global north and the global south.

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SESSION 4:
IDEOLOGY AND TIME



DISCUSSANT:
ANNELIEN DE DIJN
(UTRECHT)

Annelien de Dijn is Professor of Modern Political History at Utrecht University, where she chairs the Political History section. Her research focuses on the history of political thought in Europe and in the United States from 1700 to the present. Her first book is *French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in a Levelled Society*. She is currently finalizing her second book, *Freedom: An Unruly History*, which examines the changing meanings of freedom from Herodotus to the present.

SESSION 4:
IDEOLOGY AND TIME



CHAIR:
UĞUR AYTAÇ
(AMSTERDAM)

Uğur Aytaç is a Ph.D. candidate in political theory at the University of Amsterdam. He received his B.A.s in philosophy and economics from Bogazici University and his M.A. in philosophy and economics from the University of Bayreuth. His research interests lie primarily in methodological debates in political theory, legitimacy of political authority, and normative aspects of economic institutions. His secondary interests include moral philosophy, ideology, and epistemology.

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SESSION 5:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY



DISCUSSANT:
GORDON ARLEN
(AMSTERDAM)

Gordon Arlen is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Amsterdam, where he works on Enzo Rossi's NWO-funded "Legitimacy Beyond Consent" grant project. He received his Ph.D. in 2017 from the University of Chicago. His published work has appeared in the *European Journal of Political Theory*, *Polity*, and *Inquiry*. His book manuscript project, *Oligarchs Among Us*, provides a conceptual and normative account of the oligarchic challenge to democracy, drawing on a variety of historical and contemporary sources. In fall 2020, Gordon will be a postdoctoral research fellow at the Justitia Amplificata Centre for Advanced Study, Goethe University Frankfurt.

SESSION 6:
SURVEILLANCE AND EXPLOITATION



DISCUSSANT:
NICHOLAS VROUSALIS
(ROTTERDAM)

Nicholas Vrousalis is Associate Professor in practical philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He read economics at Cambridge and received his doctorate in political philosophy from Oxford. Since 2017 he has been an associate editor of the *Review of Social Economy*. His main research areas are distributive ethics, Marxism, and democratic theory.

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PRACTICAL INFORMATION



TECHNICAL DETAILS

- Software: Setting up & using *Discord*.
- Test sessions: Dates & times for the software test sessions.
- Etiquette: The do-s and don't-s of virtual conferencing.



SOCIAL LIFE

- Meal recipes: Optional recipes for lunch and dinner.
- Virtual tour: Take a virtual tour of Amsterdam.

SOFTWARE

The software used during this conference is *Discord*:

Discord is a chat app, similar to programs such as *Skype* or *Team-Speak*, or professional communications platforms like *Slack*. It supports video calls, voice chat, and text, allowing users to get in touch however they please.

Clarifications regarding what is on your screen:

- The far left side of the screen is where Direct Messages and any servers you have joined will show up.
- The left side of the screen will be either your Friends List or a list of channels in a server, depending on whether you are on the Direct Messages screen or a *Discord* server, respectively.

Underneath these lists will be your **username** and **profile image**, your “online” status, an indication of whether your microphone is muted, or whether your headphones are “deafened”, and your settings.

- The centre of the screen is where the chat messages are. If you are on the Direct Messages screen without a chat open, it will either be your activity page or your Friends List.
- The right side of the screen—if you are on a server or group Direct Messages—will be the list of members on the server and their roles. If you are on Direct Messages, this won’t appear.

If you search for something in the search bar up at the top right, the search results will appear on the right-hand side and, as a result, hide the member list.

The channels:

- *Discord* has two type of channels: text and voice channels. During the conference sessions the voice channels will be used; during the breaks you are free to join any (type of) channel you prefer.

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- During the conference, all sessions will take place in the “Main conference room”. The organisers of the conference will initiate a video call in that channel before the start of the sessions.
- The conference dinner and drinks will take place in the voice channel “Dining room”.
- The other channels (for example, Room 1, Kitchen area, etc.) can be used to talk to participants of the conference separately from the main group. You can also talk to someone on an individual basis by right clicking their name and clicking “Message” or “Call”.

INSTRUCTIONS ON SETTING UP DISCORD

1. **Access Discord.** *Discord* can either be used in a web browser on a computer by going to <https://discord.com>, or by using the *Discord* application on a computer. The browser-based version is a good choice if you just want to try out *Discord*, but the app notifies you when there is a new message in a channel or a chat that you are in.

Note: Although you can also use *Discord* on your mobile phone by downloading the *Discord* app via the Google Play Store or the iTunes App Store, the mobile app does not allow you to share your screen.

2. **Create an account on Discord.** You can create your account on the *Discord* registration page, or in the app. You’ll be able to enjoy all of the chat functions *Discord* has to offer, but it’s important to claim your account by verifying your email address. This will ensure that you keep your username and **Discriminator** (those four digits next to your user name), as well as remember all the servers you’ve joined! To claim your account, simply check the email that you used to create your account. If you do not see an email, simply click the **Resend** button in the orange banner at the top of the app.

3. **Join the AGCPT2020 server.** To do this, click the “+” icon at the bottom of the **server list**, which is on the left-hand side of your *Discord* app. Next, click “Join a server” and enter the following link: [e-mail the organisers for the link].
4. **“Befriend” the organisers of the conference.** This is needed so that they’ll be able to initiate video calls. If you’d like to initiate a separate video call with a participant in the conference, you will need to “befriend” them as well. When the organisers are online, you can do this by right-clicking their name and clicking “Add Friend”. Otherwise, click the Home button on the top-left, click “Friends” on the left-menu, click the green “Add Friend” button at the top, and type in the **Discord Tag**. The organisers’ **Discord Tags** are:
 - a. AkshathJitendranath#2146
 - b. StefanoMerlo#1472
 - c. SanneGroothuis#2257
 - d. MarinaUzunova#2572

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GUIDELINES ON CREATING YOUR INDIVIDUAL PROFILE

To **customise your account** settings, click on the cog/gear icon near your username at the bottom left part of the app. You can use the settings to, for example:

- Change your username, email, avatar, and password, disable or delete your account, or enable two-factor authentication. (Access the “My Account” tab and click the “Edit” button.)

Note: *Discord* will only let you change your username two times per hour. Before you officially press “Save”, you can double check your icon/username in the preview and see what it will look like before confirming the change.

Note: You will not be able to change the 4 digits/numbers after the username. For this you’ll need to subscribe to the paid version, called *Nitro*.

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- Enable two-factor authentication to protect your *Discord* account with an extra layer of security. (Access the “My Account” tab and click “Enable Two-Factor Auth”.)
- Change who can Direct Message you, whose Direct Messages get scanned by *Discord* for safety, who can add you as a friend, and what data you send to *Discord*. (Access the “Privacy & Safety” tab.)
- Edit your Voice Chat settings and whether you press a button for your microphone to activate in voice chats, or change the camera that *Discord* accesses for video calls. (Access the “Voice & Video” tab.)

Note: This tab includes a button for testing/previewing your video.

- Edit your notification settings. (Access the “Notifications” tab.)
- Alter the appearance of the *Discord* window or turn on Developer Mode. (Access the “Appearance” tab.)
- Choose your preferred language. (Access the “Language” tab.)

TEST SESSIONS

To allow you to try out your equipment and get comfortable with using *Discord*, two test sessions will take place. During both sessions the organisers will be present on *Discord* to answer any questions you may have regarding the software. You can join either of the sessions at any time that is most convenient for you.

If you encounter problems setting up your account and/or trying to enter the test session, please let us know via e-mail—we will keep track of our inbox during the test sessions.

TEST SESSION 1: 25 May 2020 (Monday) at 10:00–12:00 CEST.

TEST SESSION 2: 26 May 2020 (Tuesday) at 19:00–21:00 CEST.

If you are unable to join either of these sessions but would like to test your equipment and/or *Discord*, please send us a message so we can find a time that would work for you.

CONFERENCE ETIQUETTE

Although many of you will have (extensive) experience joining video meetings at this point, we thought it might be nice to include a short refresher on best practices for video meetings.

PREPARATIONS

1. Test your internet connection, make sure it is stable and strong enough. One website that allows you to test your internet speed is <https://www.speedtest.net>.
2. Test your audio and video.
3. Familiarise yourself with the video-teleconferencing software before the meeting, for example during the scheduled test sessions.
4. If possible, find a quiet, well-lit location with minimal background noise.
5. If possible, turn off messaging applications to ensure that you are not distracted during the meeting.
6. Join the meeting a couple of minutes before the start.

USING THE SOFTWARE DURING THE CONFERENCE

Joining a call. You can join a call by clicking the channel in which the call takes place. At this point, your video isn't shared with everyone else in the channel, but you'll be able to join in the chat with your voice. To share your video, press the **Video** button in the bottom left corner (within the **Voice and Video Panel**) or the **Turn on Camera** button within the video call window.

Note: Joining another channel will disconnect you from the **Go Live** session. You can only view one stream, within one voice channel at a time.

Sharing your screen. During a video call, you will be able to share your screen with other participants in the call. To do so, follow these steps:

1. Join a  voice channel in your server.
2. Press the  **Go Live** streaming icon in the voice status panel (near the bottom left corner) and a new window will pop out.
3. Select an individual application window to share, or select an entire screen to share.
4. Press the **Go Live** button at the bottom of the window when you are ready to share your stream. If you change your mind on which screen you'd like to share, you can directly switch the screen that is being shared from the **Go Live** panel.

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Which channel to join. During the conference, all sessions will take place in the “Main conference room”. The organisers of the conference will initiate a video call in that channel before the start of the sessions.

The conference dinner and drinks will take place in the voice channel “Dining room”.

During breaks, you can use any of the other voice or text channels to talk to participants of the conference. You can also talk to others individually by right clicking their name and clicking “Message” or “Call”.

How to mute incoming notifications, users, and channels. While there is no way to mute the **Direct Message** system yet, there are ways of muting single users as well as channels and servers:

1. Setting your account to **Do Not Disturb** will mute all **incoming notifications** unless you're tagged in a message or messaged directly. Click on your avatar and click on **Do Not Disturb**.
2. To mute a **single user** on a server, right-click on the person's username and check the **Mute** button. If you want to unmute them later, just uncheck the button using the same steps. Muting

a user means you don't hear their voice in a voice chat, but they can still hear you. Blocking someone prevents you from seeing their text messages; however, you will still hear them if you're both in the same voice chat.

3. To mute a **channel** in a server, right-click on the channel that you want to mute and check the **Mute** button. You can also click the alarm bell at the top of the screen. Follow the same steps to unmute the channel.

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BEST PRACTICES FOR INTERACTING WITH THE OTHERS

Mute yourself. When you are not speaking, please mute your microphone. This will significantly reduce background noise for everyone on the call. If you would like to say something during the discussion, let the chair of the session know by typing “Question” and/or “Comment” in the channel chat. The chair will take stock of everyone who would like to contribute to the discussion and indicate whose turn it is to talk (at which point you can unmute yourself).

Use the breaks to network. For example, ask some people you would like to speak to to join you in a separate channel to (video) chat, or join one of the channels to meet new people.

General tips. Please follow these best practices for videoconferencing:

1. If possible, try to prevent having light behind you, especially from a window, or directly overhead. The best setup is to have the light facing you.
2. If possible, try to keep things in your background that may be distracting for you or others to a minimum. For example, a wall in the background is less distracting than a busy road.
3. If possible, try not to multi-task during the sessions.

MEAL RECIPES

In a traditional conference, we have the luxury of taking a break and making our way to a lunch, and dinner spot that doesn't actually require us to do the cooking. With a virtual conference, however, we do not have such a luxury. Further, given that we will be spending most of the two days online, we wouldn't even have the time to cook a meal. We therefore thought that it would be nice to have a few quick and easy one-pot meal recipes within the conference booklet that you can make the night before the conference starts, and which can be eaten over the two days for lunch and dinner.

Do note that this is strictly supererogatory and not mandatory. But even if you do not make any of these meals, it would be nice, if possible, to eat together over the two days of the conference as we would traditionally do.

A VEGAN OPTION: WEST AFRICAN PEANUT STEW

Prep Time: 10 mins

Cook Time: 45 mins

Ingredients

1. 1 tbsp olive oil
2. 4 cloves garlic
3. 1 tbsp grated fresh ginger
4. 1 or 2 sweet potato(es)
5. 1 onion
6. 1 tsp cumin
7. 1/4 tsp crushed red pepper
8. 1 can of tomatoes
9. 1/2 cup natural style peanut butter
10. 6 cups vegetable broth
11. 1/2 bunch collard greens (4–6 cups chopped)
12. 4 cups of rice

Optional garnishes

1. 1/4 bunch cilantro
2. 1/3 cup chopped peanuts

Instructions

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1. Peel and grate the ginger using a small holed cheese grater. Mince the garlic, and dice the onion. Sauté the onion, ginger, and garlic in a large pot with the olive oil over medium heat for 2–3 minutes, or until the onion becomes soft and translucent.
2. While the onion, ginger, and garlic are sautéing, peel and dice the sweet potato into 1/2-inch cubes. Add the sweet potato cubes, cumin, and red pepper to the pot and continue to sauté for about 5 minutes.
3. Add the tomato paste, peanut butter, and vegetable broth to the pot. Stir until the peanut butter and tomato paste have mostly dissolved into the broth. Place a lid on the pot and turn the heat up to high. Allow the stew to come up to a boil. Once it reaches a boil, turn the heat down to medium-low and allow it to simmer for 15–20 minutes, or until the sweet potatoes are very soft.
4. While the soup is simmering, prepare the collard greens. Use a sharp knife to remove each stem (cut along the side of each stem), then stack the leaves and cut them into 1/2-inch wide strips. Place the chopped collard greens in a colander and rinse very well.
5. Once the stew has simmered for 15–20 minutes and the sweet potatoes are very soft, stir in the collard greens. Let the stew simmer for about 5 minutes more, then begin to smash the sweet potatoes against the side of the pot to help thicken the stew.
6. Finally, taste the stew and add salt or red pepper, if desired. Serve the stew with a scoop of cooked rice (about 3/4 cup), a few chopped peanuts, fresh cilantro, and a drizzle of sriracha, if desired.

SOCIAL LIFE—MEAL RECIPES

A MEAT OPTION: TERIYAKI CHICKEN AND RICE

Prep Time: 5 mins

Cook Time: 30 mins

Ingredients

1. 1 boneless, skinless chicken breast
2. 1 tbsp cooking oil
3. 2 cloves of garlic, minced
4. 1 tsp grated fresh ginger
5. 1.5 cups uncooked jasmine rice (any rice works actually, but jasmine rice works best)
6. 2.5 cups water
7. Vegetables that can be stir fried (use your own imagination here)
8. 1/4 cup soy sauce
9. 2 tbsp brown sugar
10. 1 tsp toasted sesame oil
11. 2 green onions, sliced

Instructions

1. Cut the chicken breast into very small pieces, about 1/2 to 3/4-inch in size.
2. Add the cooking oil, garlic, and ginger to a large, deep skillet. Cook over medium heat for about 1 minute, then add the chicken pieces and continue to sauté just until the outside of the chicken is no longer pink. Do not over cook the chicken here, it will finish cooking with the rice.
3. Add the uncooked rice to the skillet and continue to sauté for 1–2 minutes more. You should hear the rice popping. Finally, add the water and give everything a brief stir to make sure there is no rice stuck to the bottom of the skillet.
4. Place a lid on the skillet, turn the heat up to medium-high, and allow the water to come to a full boil. Once boiling, turn the heat down to low and let it simmer for 10 minutes.
5. While the skillet is simmering over low, prepare the teriyaki sauce. In a small bowl, stir together the soy sauce, brown sugar, and toasted sesa-

me oil. The brown sugar may not fully dissolve, but that's okay. Set the sauce aside.

6. After the rice has simmered for 10 minutes, lift the lid briefly to sprinkle the frozen vegetables on top, then replace the lid immediately. Make sure the vegetables are spread evenly over the surface. Let the skillet continue to heat over low for an additional five minute.
7. After steaming the rice and vegetables together for 5 minutes, turn the heat off and let the skillet rest with the lid in place for an additional five minutes.
8. Give the teriyaki sauce another brief stir, lift the lid on the skillet, and drizzle the sauce over the vegetables. Make sure to scrape out all the sugar from the bottom of the bowl. Using a spatula or large spoon, gently fold the rice and vegetables together until everything is mostly coated in the sauce. Make sure to scoop all the way to the bottom of the skillet when folding, as the sauce will sink to the bottom.
9. Place the lid back on top and let the skillet rest for a final 5 minutes to let the flavor soak in (heat turned off). Sprinkle sliced green onions over top just before serving.

A VIRTUAL TOUR OF AMSTERDAM

Amsterdam is sparing with its sun and lavish with its wind—particularly so for the foreign visitor. The time when the city truly comes to life for the first time before the hot months of the summer is May and there would have been much to explore had we been able to host you. There is much to explore online too, however, and here we offer you some suggestions.

The place to go to for all things Amsterdam is **Iamsterdam**—a rich website aimed at visitors of the city. Recently, it has added helpful suggestions on how to discover the city online: from **virtual tours**, and **interesting short videos**, to **children-friendly virtual activities**.

For an imperfect substitute of strolling down Amsterdam's sites, we recommend browsing through the **360-degree views** of some of its highlights, including, among others, the popular central **Dam square** and the city **Vondelpark**. Or why not take a walk down a Google street view of, for example, the famous **Albert Cuyp market**? Amsterdam has been richly photographed and you can easily get a sense of the city's street life; just head to the street view of some of Amsterdam's cosy **neighbourhoods** such as the **hip De Pijp**, or the **charming Oud West**.

Under different circumstances, the second Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Political Theory would have taken place at the **John Stuart Mill College** at **VU Amsterdam**. The college houses our undergraduate **PPE programme** and you can still experience its atmosphere by watching **one of our students' video tours** or a **short campus tour of the university**.

In the following pages, we offer you our own selection of Amsterdam highlights with an impressive online presence.

RIJKSMUSEUM The Rijksmuseum is an indispensable stop for any visitor of Amsterdam. Founded in The Hague and moved to Amsterdam in the nineteenth century, the museum hosts some of the most famous paintings in the history of Dutch art. Fortunately, the museum's initiative **Rijksmuseum from home** offers a fine selection of resources that will help you explore the museum's vault from a distance:

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Watch some of the museum's curated **video introductions** to famous items from the vault, including, among others, Pieter Roelofs on Jan Steen's *The Merry Family* (1668), Maaïke Rikhof on Thérèse Schwartz's *Portrait of a Young Woman, with 'Puck' the Dog* (1879–1885), Josephina de Fouw on Nicolaas Muys' *The Family Van Beeftingh* (1797), and Justine Rinnooy Kan on Johannes Vermeer's *The Little Street* (1657–1658).

You can also take a **virtual tour** of the Rijksmuseum's Gallery of Honour—home to such famous paintings as Jan Steen's *The Merry Family*, Johannes Vermeer's *The Milkmaid* (1660) and, of course, Rembrandt van Rijn's *The Night Watch* (1642).

Finally, a wonderful resource for art enthusiasts of all ages is the initiative **RijksCreative**—a series of video tutorials on how to draw and paint like the great Dutch masters.



VAN GOGH One can't visit Amsterdam without stopping by the Van Gogh Museum which houses the largest collection of works by Vincent Van Gogh. The museum has a **selection of resources** for exploring its archive and galleries from home:

Take a **virtual 4K tour** of the museum to get a rare feeling of what it is like to roam its floors without the presence of crowds.

Explore the **highlights of the museum** which include such famous paintings as *Almond Blossom* (1890), *Self-portrait as a Painter* (1887–1888) and *The Bedroom* (1890). Be sure to also browse the other collections of the museum, including Van Gogh's **flower paintings, self portraits, landscapes, and still lifes**.

Read one of the **freely available books** about Van Gogh and learn more about his love of Japanese art.

Why did Van Gogh cut off his ear? **Bregje Gerritse explains**. Don't miss the **full series of short video answers** to all sorts of curious Van Gogh questions, as well as the **stories that animate his life**.

Finally, the site is full of **fun resources for children**.



THE EYE Housed in a **stunning seagull-like building** that overlooks the IJ harbour and Amsterdam's central railway station, the Eye Film Institute is a sight to behold. However, there is plenty to explore online as well. So while you wait for another opportunity to sip a cold craft beer on the museum's beautiful terrace, be sure to browse through its **recommendations**:

C Learn more about the **Eye film collection**—a wonderful portrait of Dutch film history. Don't miss the institute's **study space** which is devoted to all things archival.


A treasure trove of **archival films** from the museum's collection are freely available online.

Explore the **history of Dutch cinema** which includes such prominent figures as, among others, Joris Ivens, Johan van der Keuken, and Bert Haanstra.

Dutch cinema is famous for its long-running tradition in **experimental film** and for its **documentary school** that took off in the 1950s. Also, don't miss the online collection of the famous **IDFA film festival**.

Learn more about the **annual Eye International Conference** devoted to film preservation and restoration.

Finally, the Eye offers a host of **resources for children**.



NEMO The Nemo science museum is easily spotted from afar: the green rooftop of its **distinctive building** offers a panorama view of Amsterdam. Home to all sorts of scientific curiosities, it is a favourite place for both children and adults alike. Here are some tips for exploring the museum from home:

Browse through the museum’s curated **gallery of experiments** that you can carry out at home. These include fun DIY activities—such as **creating a chain reaction** or a **super bubble blower**—as well as challenging questions—what is **the taste of your nose?** how do you **hug someone who is very far away?**—and tests of various optical nature.

Take part in the museum’s famous **chain reaction challenge** by shooting a video or simply watching the videos of other people.

Learn about the museum’s **famous roof** which is not only an excellent panorama-viewing spot but also—during the summer months—a water fun centre with swimming-pool and beach activities.



ABOUT THE TYPE



DTL HAARLEMMER

Haarlemmer is a typeface released by the independent foundry Dutch Type Library (DTL). It was produced by Frank E. Blokland following original designs created by the famous Dutch typographer Jan van Krimpen. Van Krimpen started designing *Haarlemmer* in 1938 as a tailor-made typeface for a new edition of the Bible. The Second World War interrupted the project and, as van Krimpen became increasingly dissatisfied with *Haarlemmer*, it was abandoned. Blokland released the digital version of this typeface in 1995.

Haarlemmer is used for the main texts in this booklet, including the abstracts, and biographies.



EB GARAMOND

EB Garamond is a new Garamond-type humanist typeface designed by Georg Duffner following Claude Garamont's original specimen.

EB Garamond is used for the small caps headings in this booklet.

To learn more about Dutch typography, read Jan Midden-dorp's popular *Dutch Type* (2004).

ABOUT THE COVER



Amsterdam, 1688, Frederick de Wit.

The cover includes an element from a map of Amsterdam by the Dutch cartographer Frederick de Wit (1630–1706). De Wit, who worked during the Dutch Golden Age of the seventeenth century, is famous for his *Atlas De Wit* (*Stedenatlas De Wit*): a collection of painstakingly detailed maps of most towns in the Low Countries.

A digital version of the atlas can be consulted on the website of the National Library of the Netherlands.